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ABSTRACT
Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are realized using distributed
systems and hence critically rely on the performance and
security of the interconnecting network. The requirements
on these networks and their usage, however can differ sig-
nificantly from traditional communication networks, with
implications on all layers of the protocol stack. This paper
is motivated by these differences, and in particular by the
observation that many fundamental design aspects of these
networks are not well-understood today. In order to support
the networking community to contribute to this emerging
application domain, we present a structured overview of
the field, from topology and neighbor discovery to block
and transaction propagation. In particular, we provide the
context, highlighting differences and commonalities with tra-
ditional networks, review the state-of-the-art, and identify
open research challenges. Our paper can hence also be seen
as a call-to-arms to improve the foundation on top of which
cryptocurrencies are built.
1 INTRODUCTION
Cryptocurrencies provide means to exchange digital assets
relying on strong cryptography and, in contrast to centralized
digital currencies and central banking systems, offer decen-
tralized control. Cryptocurrencies are thus typically realized
as distributed systems. Accordingly, much existing research in
the blockchain field focused on the underlying cryptographic
primitives and on improved distributed blockchain protocols,
e.g., consensus.
The network required to connect the distributed system,
however, has received relatively little attention. However,
there is increasing evidence that the network can become
the bottleneck and root-cause for some of the most pressing
challenges blockchains face today. For example, the propa-
gation of transactions and blocks (or other control messages
for the execution of consensus algorithms), require unicast
and multicast communication services. Blockchain miners
which write transactions to the blockchain, are connected
through dedicated miner P2P networks [14], in addition to
the public blockchain P2P network. Studies show that the
cryptocurrency network layer is critical for scalability [21, 58],
security [41] and privacy [40] of a blockchain, and that an
efficient network layer enables higher transaction throughput
and stronger resilience against malicious actors [41]. Network-
ing issues are also not limited to overlays on the network
layer. Besides node discovery and data routing, the provided
network functionality for example includes the encoding and
transmission of data, and error correction, as well as mea-
surements of the network performance.
Interestingly, cryptocurrency networks and their usage,
can differ significantly from traditional communication net-
works. For example, cryptocurrency networks may come with
different requirements (e.g., related to anonymity), may need
to serve different traffic mixes (e.g., more frequent broad-
cast of transactions and states of the blockchain), may need
different routing mechanisms (e.g., source routing), or may
be more dynamic (e.g., channels and fees in PCNs). Obvi-
ously, the fact that no protocol participant can be trusted
(not only users issuing transactions but also miners and thus
information providers may act maliciously), often requires a
different design, and the incentives of all participants must
be considered.
This paper is a call-to-arms to the networking commu-
nity to identify the unique requirements of cryptocurrency
networks and address the open issues.
Our Contributions. This paper aims to provide a fast intro-
duction to cryptocurrency network issues with a focus on
open research challenges. To this end, we provide a struc-
tured overview of cryptocurrency networks, introducing the
different aspects and their context, high-lighting differences
and commonalities with traditional networks, and reviewing
the state-of-the-art. At the end of each section, we identify
and discuss research questions.
This paper hence specifically targets junior and senior
researchers with different backgrounds (e.g., in networking,
algorithms, or game theory) who would like to get an overview
of the state-of-the-art and start working in this area. It can
also serve experts and decision-makers in the networking
industry as well as interested laymen.
Related Work. This paper surveys cryptocurrency network
issues with a focus on research challenges. The most closely
related papers in this area are surveys and systematizations
of knowledge efforts on cryptocurrencies and blockchains in
general [16]. Gudgeon et al. [45] provide a comprehensive sur-
vey of offchain networks, and Neudecker et al. [72] survey the
network layer of permissionless blockchains, with a focus on
attacks and the design space (but less on research questions,
e.g., revolving around incentives or mining). Katkuri presents
a survey of data transfer and storage techniques in prevalent
cryptocurrencies and suggests improvements [55]. The focus
is on aspects related to the broadcast networks underlying
Ethereum, Nano and IOTA. Gervais et al. [41] give a thor-
ough security analysis of proof-of-work blockchain systems;
their focus is on the consensus layer (i.e., block generation)
whereas the network layer is abstracted. Troncoso et al. [94]
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Figure 1: Paper Organization
show a broader perspective covering numerous systems apart
from Bitcoin and Tor but also abstract from the network
layer. A recent paper by Delgado-Seguara et al. [23] explores
the characteristics of the peer-to-peer network established by
Bitcoin, but abstracts from the design space of the network
layer. Delgado et al. [23] provide an in-depth study of the
Bitcoin P2P network.
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows (see Figure 1). Section 2 provides an overview of
some basic aspects of cryptocurrency networks. These include
incentives, topology, communication pattern and security.
Next, we discuss core aspects, namely block propagation,
transaction propagation, P2P network topologies, and off-
chain networks in Sections 3–6. In each of these sections, we
give some background information, present the state of the
art followed by open research questions that the writers of
this paper find interesting. Finally, in Section 7 we conclude
this SOK.
2 CRYPTOCURRENCY NETWORKS IN
PERSPECTIVE
2.1 Background
Before delving into the details, we provide some background
and introduce preliminaries.
Cryptocurrencies permit mutually distrusting parties to
engage in financial operations securely. They guarantee that
a transaction issued by Alice to send money to Bob reaches
its destination at most once and only if Alice’s balance is suf-
ficiently high. Analogously, operations with multiple senders
and receivers are typically supported. The guarantees hold
despite Byzantine behavior of a fraction of the participants
(nodes) maintaining the cryptocurrency service. To this end,
cryptocurrencies rely on distributed ledger technology, which
serves as a transaction database, containing the global his-
tory with all transactions. To build this global history, typi-
cally consensus-based blockchain solutions are employed. A
blockchain consists of a replicated linked list of immutable
blocks, each block comprising batches of transactions. This
list is maintained by a large number of nodes to tolerate
malicious behavior of a small group of nodes and still reach
agreement on the blocks and their content with a consensus
protocol. An honest node will only propose and agree on
blocks that contain valid transactions: i.e., the transaction
is properly signed by the current owners of the funds, it has
not been executed already, and and the senders’ balance is
high enough.1 Using such a blockchain, virtual currency can
1To facilitate validity checks, many cryptocurrencies require outgoing
transactions to link to a previous incoming transaction. Thus, an
be transferred from senders to receivers in a fully distributed
manner, cutting out any middle man or trusted third party.
This feature has gained enormous visibility and is envisioned
to transform the financial sector and potentially bring dis-
ruptive innovation to many other sectors that traditionally
rely on trusted third parties.
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies run on top of a P2P
network. Over this network, nodes send and receive blocks
and transactions, which are the basic data structures of
cryptocurrencies. In permissionless protocols, such as Bitcoin
and Ethereum, any machine can join the network and become
a node of the P2P network. A node bootstraps its operation
with a discovery protocol to establish connections with other
nodes in the system.
In most cryptocurrencies there are two roles a node can
assume: peer or miner. Peers can create and send transac-
tions. Peers verify the correctness of received transactions and
blocks and relay them if valid. Miners do anything a peer does,
but they also generate blocks. Transactions and blocks are
typically propagated in the network using a flooding or gossip
protocol. E.g., when a node either creates or receives a trans-
action or block in Bitcoin, it announce that item and may
request it from peers if receiving an announcement of an item
it does not have yet. A node does not forward invalid items.
A node keeps valid items in memory (the mempool) and
answer requests for them. This way, each node in the network
will eventually learn about every new item. The underlying
wire protocol prescribes the data encoding and how to use
which transport protocols. E.g., Bitcoin clients establish a
TCP connection and perform a protocol-level three-way hand-
shake informing each other of the height of the blockchain
as they know it and the software version they use [51]. To
support encryption and authentication, Ethereum defines the
TCP-based DEVp2p protocol [31]. After a handshake, all
exchanged messages are encrypted and authenticated via key
material generated during the handshake.
In a later of this paper, we provide a detailed discussion of
block propagation and transaction propagation mechanisms
and measurements. Furthermore, incentives to support reli-
able information forwarding and the different topologies of
the virtual currency networks are presented.
Blockchains are typically managed by a peer-to-peer net-
work of nodes which collectively create and validate new
blocks. In order to improve scalability, additional payment
channel networks may be implemented offchain, offloading
the blockchain. Such protocols rely on the “parent blockchain"
for security. Interestingly, however, cryptocurrency networks
and their applications and usage, can differ significantly from
traditional communication networks. These differences in-
fluence the required performance, security, and incentives,
and touch all layers of the network stack. Indeed, while early
solutions relied on either a centralized issuer [84, 101] or
creating inter-user credit [37], which required users to trust
attempt to double spend consists in getting the same transaction into
multiple blocks that the receipients consider valid by mistake.
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the original issuer; decentralized systems more critically de-
pend on the network to connect their constituent parts. One
main challenge is the fact that cryptocurrencies are a rela-
tively recent concept and many aspects are not well explored
and documented, even compared to other components of
blockchains and cryptocurrencies. With the exception of Bit-
coin and Ethereum, many cryptocurrencies lack substantial
documentation about their operational details, other than
information scattered in the source code repositories. At the
same time, the dependability of cryptocurrencies is becoming
increasingly important, and vulnerabilities and inefficiencies
are a major concern given the corresponding direct financial
implications.
2.2 Characteristics
Before diving into the details of the state-of-the-art and
research challenges, we give an overview of some of the dis-
tinguished characteristics of cryptocurrency networks.
A first important aspect concerns incentives. Since there
is no central party or consortium paying for the resources
(bandwidth, CPU, storage, ..) necessary to maintain the
distributed ledger, the participating nodes must be remuner-
ated through the protocol directly. Similarly to traditional
peer-to-peer networks, nodes maintaining distributed ledgers
require incentives to motivate nodes to propagate information
(transactions, blocks, control information) between them. In
addition, cryptocurrencies also need an incentive system to
motivate nodes to verify blocks and the transactions included
in them and discard invalid ones. In Bitcoin, nodes generating
blocks are called miners. As a remuneration of their work
the creator of block obtains a block reward and a fee for
each transaction in the block. Thus, miners have an incentive
to keep the knowledge of any transaction that offers a high
fee to themselves instead of forwarding them, as any other
node that becomes aware of the transaction will compete
to include it in a block first and claim the associated fee.
Additional incentive questions involve the use of lightweight
nodes (know as SPV wallets) that rely on messages from
a full-node for their operation. SPV wallets do not hold a
complete copy of the blockchain and so must rely on other
nodes to track payments sent to them.
Another interesting characteristic is formed by the preva-
lent communication pattern. Many cryptocurrency networks
are characterized by frequent broadcast operations, e.g., re-
lated to the communication of transactions and states of
the blockchain. Furthermore, systems such as Bitcoin do not
follow a complex multihop routing scheme but employ a sim-
ple flooding-based strategy where all peers in the network
replicate the information that has been flowing through the
system so far, i.e., keep a complete copy of the blockchain.
Hence, there is no need to forward queries to other peers, as
all information should to be available at a neighbor.
There are also differences in routing itself. For example,
existing network routing algorithms for data transmission
experience unique challenges when applied, to payment chan-
nel networks. In payment channel networks, link capacities
represent payment balances, which can be highly dynamic:
messages are financial transactions, which may change liq-
uidities and introduce additional security requirements (e.g.,
related to privacy), and different routes may be used at dif-
ferent monetary costs (e.g., as intermediate nodes charge
fees for forwarding). If link capacities (representing funds) or
“liquidities” should be kept private, it may become difficult
to design an efficient route discover process [90].
The network topology in cryptocurrencies can be fairly dif-
ferent from traditional networks. For example, while Bitcoin
and Ethereum rely on flat random graph topologies, Car-
dano [19] uses different roles influencing how nodes connect
to each other and to users (see Section 5). Also in this regard,
offchain networks are particularly interesting. Since in these
networks, capacities represent financial balances which may
need to be kept confidential, new threats may be introduced
which are not encountered in classic P2P networks.
In terms of security and dependability, cryptocurrencies
critically depend on a correct functioning of the consensus
layer, and the knowledge of the set of information consensus
is to be agreed on (e.g., blocks and transactions). Flooding or
gossip protocols are used for the propagation of the required
information to all peers of the network. While unstructured
P2P networks have been used for decades (e.g., Gnutella) and
were extensively analyzed, the considered adversarial models
do not match well the threats to blockchain systems. For
example, anonymity providing networks (i.e., onion routing
networks [42]) have different requirements regarding informa-
tion propagation than blockchain based systems. Commonly
considered requirements in anonymity providing networks
are high performance, low bandwidth cost, resistance to traf-
fic analysis, and resistance to denial of service (DoS). For
example, distributed denial of service attacks can be used to
gain advantages in mining, voting, and other business and
protocol-related activities [4, 53, 97]. To prevent malicious
nodes from flooding the network with invalid blocks, nodes
use a store-and-forward propagation model, where each node
downloads the full block and verifies it prior to propagating
it to its peers. This model allows nodes to identify any node
which propagates invalid blocks as malicious, and limits the
effect of such attacks to the nodes which are directly attacked.
There are also implications on performance. While individ-
ual nodes may support high transaction rates, the distributed
propagation can introduce novel kinds of bottlenecks. Indeed,
one of the main issues in blockchain systems is their scalabil-
ity. Increasing the number of transactions processed by the
system naturally requires more resources such as bandwidth
and storage, and especially the consensus protocols underly-
ing cryptocurrencies can slow down execution, or even effect
security. For example, Nakamoto’s consensus protocol which
relies on the longest chain for Bitcoin is known to be suscepti-
ble to attacks by weaker attackers as transaction throughputs
increase. The main underlying cause of this decline in security
is the fact that blocks containing more transactions propagate
more slowly through the network, which causes forks to form
in the blockchain [21]. As a result, a great deal of work has
been devoted to improving block propagation times (see in
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Section 3). In order for Bitcoin to function as a decentralized
system, it must allow nodes to receive blocks at a higher rate
than the rate at which blocks are being produced. Indeed, if
blocks are produced at a higher rate than a node is capable of
receiving them, then said node cannot keep track of balances
stored in the blockchain, cannot determine whether or not
transactions and blocks are valid, and is in effect excluded
from the Bitcoin network. The block propagation time to
reach the majority of the network does not depend solely
on a receiving node’s bandwidth, but also on the network
topology, the bandwidth of all nodes, and the manner in
which blocks propagate. In offchain networks, as mentioned
also earlier, novel issues arise which lie at the intersection
between performance and security. In offchain networks, to
protect user privacy, only the total capacity of a channel is
disclosed, but not how the funds are distributed among the
the channel participants [62, 86, 88]. Channel transactions
might therefore fail and the routing algorithms attempt differ-
ent execution paths until one succeeds, which can introduce
delays. Routing algorithms in payment channels networks
therefore, have to account for the unique characteristic of
channels to provide satisfactory path recommendations.
3 BLOCK PROPAGATION
3.1 What is it about?
Blocks in cryptocurrency protocols are used to establish
common state. They form the input the consensus protocol
strives to reach agreement on. Blocks order transactions, thus
the state of the network can be constructed by following the
ordering of transactions included in blocks in the consensus
chain. Transactions once included in a block deep in the
consensus chain are considered confirmed. Therefore, block
propagation is an issue of utmost importance to the consensus
process. How fast miners learn about new blocks, and how
quickly blocks can be created and validated are crucial for
the efficiency of a cryptocurrency.
A block consists of a header and a set of transactions.
These transactions can be relayed by the sender together
with the block, but this wastes bandwidth if they are already
stored in the mempool of the receiver.
Blocks are typically re-propagated to all connected peers
as soon as basic validity of the announcement has been es-
tablished (e.g. after the proof-of-work check). In Bitcoin,
propagation uses the NewBlock and NewBlockHashes mes-
sages. The NewBlock message includes the full block and
is sent to a small fraction of connected peers (usually the
square root of the total number of peers). All other peers are
sent a NewBlockHashes message containing just the hash of
the new block. Those peers may request the full block later
if they fail to receive it from anyone within reasonable time.
Blocks can be relayed with a compressed encoding. Effi-
cient propagation of blocks is critical to achieving consensus,
reducing storage bloat, overcoming network firewall bottle-
necks, and allowing scaling to a large number of transactions
per second. Delayed blocks can lead to forks [21]: based on
measurements of the rate of information propagation in the
Figure 2: Block Propagation Topics
network, the propagation delay in the network can be the
primary cause for blockchain forks. blockchain forks should
be avoided as they are symptomatic for inconsistencies among
the replicas in the network. As a mitigation strategy, the
authors propose pipelining the block’s delivery, i.e., starting
to transmit blocks before they have been fully validated.
One of the reasons for such delays is churn. Imtiaz et al. [49]
report that almost all (97%) Bitcoin nodes are connected
intermittently only, which results in significant numbers of un-
successful exchanges, roughly twice the figure for continuously
connected nodes. In particular, they demonstrate experimen-
tally that this churn leads to a 135% average increase in block
propagation time (i.e., 336.57 ms vs 142.62 ms), and can lead
to as high as an 800-fold increase in the worst case measured.
Also permissioned blockchain networks based on Byzan-
tine Fault Tolerance (BFT) consensus algorithms are highly
affected by the propagation time. Nguyen et al. [73] demon-
strate how a network delay leads to a 30 times larger offset
in the consensus layer in Hyperledger.
Often, miners collaborate in mining pools to share the
risks and rewards of finding blocks. To this end, a dedicated
server is connected to a node that acts as a gateway to a cryp-
tocurrency network. This node gathers newly transmitted
transactions and newly built blocks to construct a new block
template. The template header is then sent via a mining
pool server to the miners which attempt to complete it to a
valid block. In the simplest approach for Bitcoin, the miners
try different values for the nonce field in the header. If the
resulting hash has enough leading zeros for the current diffi-
culty level, i.e., when the block is completed, it is sent back
to the server, which then uses the gateway node to publish
the newly formed block to the network and distributes the
reward among the miners of the pool corresponding to their
contributions.
In 2017, Bitcoin derived at least 95% of its mining power
from 10 mining pools; in the Ethereum network, 6 pools are
responsible for 80% of the mining power [61].
3.2 State of the Art
A measurement campaign [70] showed that 2016-2018 it takes
between 2 and 20 seconds until 90% of the nodes announce
the reception of a new block, with a tendency for shorter
propagation latency in the more recent past. This is a vast
improvement considering that Donet et al. [25] reported that
after 84 seconds new blocks have been reached 50% of the
nodes and less than 1% of the blocks is known by 90% of the
nodes in the same time.
Compressed block encoding. Many proposals to minimize the
bandwidth consumption for block propagation exist. One such
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proposal for Bitcoin addresses the inefficiency of broadcasting
blocks with all the transactions included. By the time a new
block is created, it is very likely that most peers have these
same transactions stored in their mempool. As such, relaying
new blocks causes inbound bandwidth spikes for receiving
nodes and potentially large outbound bandwidth spikes for
nodes that receive blocks before their peers, since they will
flood the network with the new, raw block data.
Xtreme Thinblocks (XThin) [95], deployed in Bitcoin Un-
limited (BU) clients uses Bloom filter encoding the transac-
tion IDs in nodes’ mempool, thus only missing transactions
must be exchanged. In an alternative, the Compact Blocks
protocol [1], deployed in the Bitcoin Core, Bitcoin ABC, and
Bitcoin Unlimited clients, the blockâĂŹs transaction IDs are
announced shortened to 6-bytes. If the receiver has missing
transactions, it requests them separately. For 𝑛 denoting the
number of transactions, the network cost is hence 6𝑛 bytes
while, XThinâĂŹs cost is in the order of 𝑚 log 𝑓 + 6𝑛, with
𝑚 referring to the number of transactions at the receiver
and a false positive rate of 𝑓 . Thus, if the receiver is missing
many transactions, Compact Blocks have an extra roundtrip
time compared to Xthin, which may cost more if enough
transactions are missing. Graphene [75] combines the use of
a Bloom Filter with Invertible Bloom Lookup Tables (IBLTs)
[43]. The main concept of Graphene’s approach consists in
shrinking the size of the senderâĂŹs Bloom filter by increas-
ing its false positive rate, and correcting any false positives
at the receiver with an IBLT. The summed size of the two
structures is smaller than using either alone. In practice,
this technique performs significantly better than Compact
Blocks for all but the smallest number of transactions, and
it performs better asymptotically than any approach relying
on Bloom-filters only. In comparison to XThin, Graphene
uses significantly lower bandwidth both when the receiver is
and is not missing transactions. However, Graphene may use
an additional roundtrip time to repair missing transactions.
The protocols described above rely on a single peer to send
the complete data of a block, opposed to using multiple peers
to transmit partial data. Velocity [20] is an approach that
exploits the fact that typically several peers already have
(parts of the) data in a block. To this end, it applies Fountain
codes, which provide a mechanism by which information can
be encoded such that the resulting segments can be prob-
abilistically re- assembled into the original data when the
number of the received segments exceeds a threshold.
Upon receiving an inv message, a receiver requests any
unknown blocks using a get_sym request to all its neighboring
peers. Peers which have information on the requested block(s)
respond with repeated sym responses, each encoding one
symbol. The receiver collects these symbols and reconstructs
the corresponding blocks when it has received a sufficient
number of symbols. If the reconstruction succeeds, it notifies
its peers to stop symbol transmission. Note that this approach
can be used for node bootstrapping in addition to speeding
up synchronization.
Stratum Mining Protocol. Stratum [50, 78] is the de-facto
standard mining communication protocol used by blockchain-
based cryptocurrency systems. It enables miners to reliably
and efficiently fetch jobs from mining pool servers.
Stratum was initially a proposal for an open source client-
server overlay protocol to support lightweight clients. The
Stratum mining protocol extended this proposal to a net-
working protocol for pooled mining services on the Bitcoin
network and many other blockchain protocols. The protocol
establishes client-server connections using plain TCP sock-
ets between mining clients and a pool operator or server to
distribute new work defined through a blockchain’s proof of
work protocol in human readable format.
Recabarren et al. in [82] exploit StratumâĂŹs lack of en-
cryption to develop passive and active attacks on BitcoinâĂŹs
mining protocol, with important implications on the privacy,
security and even safety of mining equipment owners. Active
attacks can hijack shares submitted by miners, and their
associated payouts, by modifying TCP packet surreptitiously
without causing disconnections and session resets. To miti-
gate such attacks, the authors proposes Bedrock, a Stratum
extension that protects the privacy and security of mining
participants with mining cookies. Each miner shares a se-
cret with the pool and includes in its puzzle computations,
preventing attackers from hijacking the solutions.
Weak blocks. In order to speed up block propagation even
further, one approach is to let miners broadcast blocks they
are working on before they have finished the corresponding
proof of work. More precisely, so called weak or near blocks
whose proof of work is insufficient for the target difficulty,
can be disseminated early. As a consequence, when the block
is fully mined the corresponding payload has been received
and validated by most nodes already and only the headers
needs to be broadcast and processed [3].
Traditionally, the weak blocks are discarded in Bitcoin,
wasting their proof of work entirely, contrary to the mission of
securing the chain with any and all sufficient proofs of work.
Weak blocks by definition have shorter interarrival times and
can be used by miners to both receive strong confirmation
signals for weak transactions (transactions in weak blocks) as
well as anticipate forks sooner. Many updates to Nakamoto
Consensus have been proposed that utilize similar ideas, yet
no protocol change to utilize weak blocks has made its way
into the Bitcoin Core source code. Some, such as BitcoinNG
[32], exploitt weak blocks to store and propagate transactions.
The key blocks serve to elect a new leader, granting that
miner the right to extend the chain with weak blocks. The
protocol splits rewards between miners of previous leader
elections to incentivize against malicious behavior such as
selfish mining or hidden block extension attacks. Another
similar proposal termed Flux [103] augments the existing
Bitcoin protocol with weak blocks such that chains of weak
blocks or sub-chains contribute to a chain’s proof of work.
Using the heaviest chain rule as its consensus rule, it can
provide faster transaction confirmation times by ensuring
that key blocks that link to sub-chains contain transactions
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included in the sub-chain’s weak or sub-blocks. This can work
in practice without the buy-in from all miners as well. One
can imagine that if a certain number of miners opts in for
broadcasting weak blocks, key blocks (which would also serve
as legacy Bitcoin blocks) could ensure that the dominant
chain contains some sub-chains of weak blocks.
Relay Networks. In parallel to the public P2P protocol, sep-
arate relay networks have been designed to increase net-
work efficiency for miners. The first such system for Bitcoin,
called Bitcoin relay network [69], achieved this by disseminat-
ing blocks without full block verification and retransmitting
known transactions. It consisted of a few nodes (supported
by donations) scattered around the globe, all of which peer
with each other. Another approach, Falcon [10], relies on
cut-through routing for faster block propagation in addition
to minimal validation and a hand-optimized topology. More
recently, FIBRE [14] has been initiated to provide a simi-
lar service by combining cut-through routing with compact
blocks and forward error correction over UDP (the normal
Bitcoin protcol uses TCP) for registered users. Both Falcon
and FIBRE can greatly reduce block propagation times and
block orphan rates in the Bitcoin network, as shown in [74].
However, it is important to note that neither was designed,
nor is suitable, to scale Bitcoin. Bitcoin cannot rely on these
relay networks to achieve higher throughput, since the use
of a relay network to scale, places the control over which
transactions are included in the blockchain, and which miners
may participate, in the hands of its operator. For example,
the relay network operator may choose (or be coerced) to
propagate blocks only from one group of miners, and reject
all others, or to propagate blocks only to one group of miners,
and not to others. Worse still, it might reject all blocks which
contain transactions involving a specific address, effectively
banning its owner from using it.
State Synchronization. For new nodes to be able to con-
tribute to the P2P network quickly, Ethereum provides a
state synchronization protocol. The first message sent by two
Ethereum peers after the handshake describes their status
containing information on the nodeâĂŹs protocol version,
network ID (multiple Ethereum networks exist), the hash of
the genesis block, the best known block hash and the cur-
rently used difficulty. Only connections to nodes operating on
the same network ID and genesis block are maintained. Based
on their best block hashes the nodes will then synchronize
their available information.
When a node joins the Ethereum network, it obtains a local
copy of the full blockchain by first requesting block headers,
which include block meta information such as parent block
hash, miner address. After it has compiled a list of missing
block hashes, the node then sends requests to retrieve full
block contents and verify the validity of the blockchain.
In Ethereum two validation mechanisms can be distin-
guished: 1) block header validation and 2) blockchain state
validation. Block header validation, ensures that a block-
âĂŹs parent block hash, block number, timestamp, diffi-
culty, gas limit, and valid proof-of-work hash are correct.
In contrast, blockchain state validation consists of sequen-
tially executing all transactions and thus requires significantly
more computation and time. In order to reduce the time for
new nodes to synchronize and validate the entire blockchain,
the fast sync mode has been introduced. Instead of running
blockchain state validation on all blocks since genesis (as
necessary in Bitcoin), header validation is run until a pivot
point block close to the most recent head of the blockchain
is chosen (using GET_RECEIPTS messages for meta in-
formation including gas consumption, transaction logs, and
status code). At the pivot point, a fast sync node utilizes
GET_NODE_DATA messages to download a global state
database at that block. From the pivot point onward, the
node performs full blockchain validation.
Incentives for Block Propagation. For cryptocurrencies to
function properly, blocks need to be propagated promptly
upon their creation to all other users in the network. This
is crucial both to the liveness and to the security of these
protocols. To this end, there is a need to examine that miners
are incentivised to follow block propagation rules, and not
to vary from them. Selfish mining attacks [33, 87] aim to
increase the relative fraction of blocks mined by an attacker
through timing the release of blocks created by an attacker.
The strategies differ based on how long the attacker waits
before publishing blocks from a secret chain. These attacks
show that there are cases in which miners can profit by not
propagating blocks as soon as they are created.
Another case in which miners can profit by deviating from
vanilla block propagation is SPV mining. In a similar vein, the
âĂĲSPV (simplified payment validation) miningâĂİ concept
can decrease the block propagation latency, by avoiding the
full verification of blocks and instead relaying them partly
unchecked. Originally, the approach has been developed to
expedite mining: In order to build on top of the previous
block and extend the chain, miners need the hash of the
previous block. However, they do not need the full block
with all the transaction data in order to start mining. It is
in fact sufficient to only have the hash of the previous block
header in order to mine a valid block. The incentive for SPV
mining is a rush to mine blocks as fast as possible to increase
profits. Waiting to download the full block and validate all
of the transaction results in idle time which can accumulate
to lost profits. Therefore miners may be tempted to find the
next block before they have even had time to download and
verify the previous block. Like this, miners avoid putting any
transactions in the block (apart from the coinbase transac-
tion that rewards the miner), since they cannot know which
transactions were in the previous block. Including transac-
tions could result in double spending (which would deem the
block invalid). SPV mining is one of the reasons that empty
blocks appear on the blockchain [99]. Moreover, SPV mining
increases the probability of an invalid block being used to
extend the chain and mine the next block linking to an invalid
block (since the transactions are not validated by the follow-
ing block, or even multiple blocks). This in turn results in
the network being less reliable for payments as double spends
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are more likely. In fact SPV mining has already caused a
split in the network in the past: In 2015 there was a change
implemented in the Bitcoin protocol (regarding enforcing
BIP66 strict DER signatures) that was supposed to go into
action after 95% of the network updated their software. The
way in which this was implemented is the following: Once
950 of the last 1,000 blocks were version 3 (v3) blocks, all
upgraded miners would reject version 2 (v2) blocks. On 4
July 2015, shortly after the threshold was reached, a small
miner (part of the non-upgraded 5%) mined an invalid block.
Unfortunately, it turned out that roughly half the network
hash rate was mining without fully validating blocks, and
built new blocks on top of that invalid block, causing a split.
SPV mining is also an issue in the Ethereum, and in 2018
it was discovered that F2Pool (one of the largest mining
pools at the time) was engaged in SPV mining (creating a
dispropotionate amount of empty blocks. 2
Another similar strand of attack is Spy mining among
competing mining pools. Spy mining occurs when attackers
join the pools of others to obtain hints about new blocks
appearing on the network. When a spy detects such infor-
mation via the changed headers sent to it in the Stratum
protocol, it can notify its other pool to avoid wasted work.
Thanks to SPV, the miners can start mining a new block
without seeing the old blocks content.
3.3 Open Questions
Latency and throughput of crypto currencies depend on
the efficiency of block propagation. Therefore, mechanisms
and incentives to spread newly minted blocks as quickly as
possible while minimizing bandwidth waste are crucial. At
the same time, the system design must not forego safety and
the protocols in place must ensure that blocks contain valid
transactions despite the hunt for speed.
Open Question 1. How to accelerate block propagation?
Several approaches to optimize the exchange of information
in blocks between two nodes as well the dissemination in the
network have been presented. Yet, both dimensions provide
opportunities for empirical studies of the status quo and sub-
sequently to devise new approaches to overcome this barrier
to faster transaction rates.
Open Question 2. How to incentivise mining blocks with
many valid transactions? SPV mining still poses risks, thus
designing a system preventing this behavior, e.g., with eco-
nomic incentives is still open.
Open Question 3. How to broadcast blocks within a
pool? Pools which are very well connected internally and
therefore can disseminate newly minted blocks fast, have an
advantage in mining over their competitors. Within a pool
one could consider a more permissioned model with a more
structured overlay topology for speed, balancing the possible
velocity gains with the risk of new attacks.
2https://medium.com/@ASvanevik/why-all-these-empty-Ethereum-
blocks-666acbbf002
Open Question 4. Efficient network design for mining
pools: How to get headers to miners quickly, how to dissemi-
nate the accomplished work in whole network?
Open Question 5. Should pools be âĂĲallowedâĂİ? If
not can they be prevented? What tools can be used? Can pools
be monitored? There are also questions related to incentives
(e.g., to force miners to have copies of the blockchain to make
pools less attractive).
4 TRANSACTION PROPAGATION
4.1 What it is about?
One of the main services provided to users in cryptocurrencies
is the propagation of their transactions. Users’ transactions
must reach miners in order to be included in blocks, and
similarly miners are interested in obtaining transactions of
users in order to be able to collect their associated fees. Hence,
delays in transaction propagation result in possible delays
for transaction confirmation for users, and may cause losses
of funds for miners.
BitcoinâĂŹs method for propagating transactions is flooding-
based, using the same underlying P2P network used to relay
blocks. Thus, if a user sends a transaction to a node, it is
potentially sent to all other peers of that node, and then
propagated onwards. Transaction relaying has been measured
to be slower than block propagation [25]. While 50% of blocks
were broadcast to 25% of the nodes in less than 22 seconds,
17 minutes are needed to relay 50% of the transactions to
the 25% of the nodes in the sample. Similarly, Neudecker [70]
reports that since 2017 transactions propagate to 50% of all
nodes within around 5 seconds and to 90% of all nodes within
around 15 seconds, both with a trend to increase over the
horizon of the measurement campaign.
Kim et al.[57] observed that transactions dominate the
network traffic, with clients using different strategies for trans-
action dissemination. Different protocols have been suggested,
such as Geth which relays transactions to all peers, and Par-
ity which forwards them only to a subset of size square root
of number of peers in the network.
4.2 State of the Art
Amplified DDoS. One main concern with respect to trans-
action propagation is that attackers will try to send many
transactions to nodes. If each such transaction is later propa-
gated to the entire network unconditionally, then attackers
would be able to amplify any large scale DoS attack—sending
a single message causes many more messages to be gener-
ated throughout the network. Thus, an attempt is made to
charge the attacker for sending messages. Unlike with blocks,
that are rate-limitted by the very fact that they require a
proof-of-work in order to be valid, transactions bear no such
limits. Their main cost for senders are reflected in the fees
paid by the sender. These fees are not guaranteed. In fact, if
a transaction is propagated to the entire network and later
is not entered to the blockchain, its fees are not collected.
Thus, in Bitcoin, miners only convey transactions that enter
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Figure 3: Transaction Propagation Topics
their mempool – these in turn are transactions that pay a
sufficient fee that is likely to lead to their inclusion in a block.
Similar concerns apply when users wish to increase the fees
of their transactions (possibly after finding out the the fee is
insufficient to enter a block quickly enough), or to users who
wish to double-spend previous un-confirmed transactions. If
users are allowed to replace transactions with very modest
fee increases, and the new transactions are propagated every-
where, again an attack is possible: attackers will simply send
one transaction and then replace it with newer transactions
with insignificant fee increases, thereby flooding the network
once again. Thus, miners typically set a minimal fee increase
to replace a transaction in the mempool and have it re-sent.
Similarly, if a user double spends a transaction and redi-
rects its funds elsewhere, miners will not typically relay the
double spend. This serves both as a countermeasure for
transaction flooding and as a tool to support 0-confirmation
recipient policies (which we discuss below).
Information Eclipsing and 0-Confirmation policies. Some users
may not wish to wait until transactions are included in blocks.
They then can adopt a somewhat risky policy of accepting
0-confirmation transactions, i.e., they can consider funds re-
ceived if a transaction is propagated through the network
(with fees that they estimate are sufficient to enter a block).
Since these transactions are not yet included in a block, they
are vulnerable to double spends. Most notably, double spends
by miners that need only a single block that contains a con-
flicting transaction before the double spent transaction is
included in a block itself (known as Finney attacks).
Due to the policy of miners mentioned above, double-
spend transactions are not entered into the mempool of
nodes and are not further propagated to others. This implies
that some nodes are essentially “eclipsed” by their neighbors
and may never find out about the existence of a double spend,
simply because these neighbors first received one transaction
(and forwarded that one to the node), but did not relay a
conflicting transaction that was later received, leaving the
node unaware of its existence. Information eclipsing hinders
nodes that would like to accept 0-confirmation policies.
Still, such attacks require mining power which can present
some barrier to the attack. The question of how easy it is to
attack 0-confirmation transactions without holding mining
power naturally arises. Karame et al. [54] analyzed such at-
tacks. They discuss countermeasures such as waiting a while
before accepting the payment (and checking to see if conflict-
ing transactions are propagated) and judge that these are
not always sufficient to prevent attacks. They propose modi-
fying protocol rules so that nodes forward double spending
transactions instead of dropping them to avoid information
eclipsing. They however do not analyze the effect of denial
of service attacks that may be aggravated as a result.
Privacy. An active attacker may wish to identify the node
from which transactions originated. By actively connecting
to several nodes, it is possible that a curious observer will
observe the transaction origin, or will be able to deduce it.
Biryukov et al. [12] present a deanonymization method for
a significant fraction of Bitcoin users that correlates their
pseudonyms with public IP addresses. The method explicitly
targets peers behind NAT or firewalls, and can differentiate
between nodes with the same public IP. They show ways to
counteract the fact that nodes may use TOR to hide their
IP and essentially utilize an anti DoS countermeasure in
Bitcoin to cut off access to TOR. The main deanonimization
technique is to identify nodes via the set of nodes it connects
to (its entry nodes), transactions are mapped to a set of
entry nodes, which uses a fingerprint to associate together
transactions with similar sets, which suggests they belong to
the same clients. The authors primarily propose to change
the set of entry nodes often to avoid such correlations.
Neudecker and Hartenstein evaluate a form of deanonymiza-
tion in [71]. They compare clustering approaches using trans-
action data (like signatures for different public keys that
appear together in transactions) with clustering based on
network data. Finding a correlation between the two likely
means that both approaches in fact approximate the de-
sired outcome. They show that for the majority of users no
correlation between network information and the clustering
performed on blockchain data could be found. A small num-
ber of participants do exhibit correlations that might make
them susceptible to network based deanonymization attacks.
The Dandelion protocol [15] is a suggestion to provide bet-
ter network-layer anonymity for transacting users. The main
construction in Dandelion is based on having a forwarding
phase for transactions before they are widely distributed,
trying to mask the origin of transactions. Nodes agree on
some full ordering of the network (i.e. some Hamiltonian
cycle) which is changed every few minutes in order to avoid
the adversary learning it. Transactions are first broadcast
along this path for a random (small) number of steps. After
this phase, broadcast is done through diffusion as it is done
today in Bitcoin. Dandelion++ [35] extends Dandelion to
defend against adversaries that are allowed to disobey the
protocol. The core improvement is moving from forwarding
through a long line graph to a referral 4-regular graph in the
initial phase (before diffusion).
Incentives. The incentive of a node to participate in the dis-
semination of transactions is unclear. As an example, consider
the case of a large transaction with high fee. In Bitcoin, the
miner’s incentive is to not propagate the transaction to other
miners, in order to reduce competition (so it can include the
transaction in one of its own blocks and claim the fee).
Although this field was studied thoroughly in the context
of P2P networks (examples in [27], [26]), one of the first paper
examining this for cryptocurrencies was [7]. In this paper,
the authors offer to augment the protocol with a scheme that
rewards information propagation, while balancing it with
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the incentive to decrease competition. They show that their
scheme is sybil-proof (robust against creating clones) and
has low overhead (a total reward that is not too high).
An improvements is proposed in [30], where additionally
to awarding the propagating nodes, the authors propose
“smart routing". In this mechanism, nodes directly route the
transactions to a round leader, which is known in advance
(first-leader-then-block (FLTB) consensus protocols). This
mechanism increases the bandwidth efficiency by reducing
the propagation of redundant transactions.
4.3 Open Questions
If the miners do not have access to a large number of trans-
actions to put into blocks, the throughput and latency of the
cryptocurrency will be suboptimal. In addition to the techni-
cal limits of spreading transactions widely, incentives play a
very important role here and must be designed carefully.
Open Question 6. How to avoid transaction floods? An
attacker may try to flood the network with meaningless trans-
actions and thus cause the nodes to waste resources on them.
How can one quickly identify bad transactions and discard
them? How to trade off the verification cost, punishment
mechanisms and velocity?
Open Question 7. How to balance DOS prevention and
0-confirmation requirement? On the one hand, nodes strive to
avoid DoS attacks by not allowing the propagation of double-
spend transactions. On the other hand, users want low-latency
cryptocurrency systems and thus favor 0-confirmation policies.
Mechanisms to meet these two conflicting goals would allow
for a better user experience.
Open Question 8. How to model and analyse cryptocur-
rencies? The costs and benefits of propagating the different
protocol messages deserves a more thorough analysis under
realistic utility assumptions. This will uncover further weak-
nesses of current mechanisms and inform the development
of superior approaches.
Open Question 9. How to implement a suitable reward
system? Currently prevalent mechanisms incentivise nodes
to keep transactions with high fees to themselves, instead
of propagating them widely. To alleviate this shortcoming,
one must find better methods to align the incentives of nodes
and cryptocurrency users. In addition, strategies that allow a
superior method to be adopted quickly must be developed.
5 TOPOLOGY OF THE P2P NETWORK
5.1 What is it about?
The Bitcoin P2P network topology is formed by each peer
connecting to 8 nodes (outbound connections) and accepting
up to 125 in-coming connections. Outbound destinations are
randomly selected among known identities. In other cryp-
tocurrencies, nodes are assigned roles that influence the topol-
ogy. For example, Cardano distinguishes between mutually
exclusive core, relay, and edge node roles [19]. The core nodes
create blocks and run the consensus protocol, in other words,
the core nodes maintain the blockchain. Relay nodes protect
the core nodes, serving as intermediaries between the public
internet where the edge nodes reside and the core node. If
relay nodes are attacked, this may lead to a service inter-
ruption, but the integrity of the core nodes (and thus the
Cardano blockchain) is not compromised. Relay nodes are
fully under the control of the federated committee of initial
Cardano stakeholders. Edge nodes create the payload of the
blocks. They can be run by anyone on their computer to
create currency transactions. They cannot directly communi-
cate with core nodes, only with relay nodes and with other
edge nodes. Also Ripple distinguishes between different roles
for nodes, partitioning them in to superpeers and leafs[83].
A nodes in the leaf role does not route messages and only
connects to super peers. In the superpeer role, a peer accepts
incoming connections from other leaves and superpeers up
to the configured slot limit. It also routes messages.
Before being able to send and receive protocol messages a
node has to find other nodes to connect to join the network.
This discovery process typically relies on static information
sources and/or distributed hash table (DHT) approaches,
discussed in the first part of this section. Knowledge of the
network topology can give parties an advantage in the dis-
persal of information (blocks, transactions) which can lead
to security risks. Because of this, there has been extensive
research and development of tools and techniques aimed at
exploring and mapping the Bitcoin P2P topology. The same
holds true for many other crypto-currencies. We present here
some of these works and their main contributions.
5.2 State of the Art
Discovery. To join a cryptocurrency P2P network, a new node
must find other nodes to connect with. In Bitcoin, a node
first tries to connect to nodes it knows from participating
previously. If no connections can be established this way, or
if the node connects for the very first time, it queries a list of
well known DNS seeds. As a last resource, it will try to connect
to hardcoded seed nodes. The DNS seeds are maintained by
Bitcoin community members: some of them provide dynamic
DNS seed servers which automatically get IP addresses of
active nodes by scanning the network; others provide static
DNS seeds that are updated manually and are more likely to
provide IP addresses for inactive nodes [13]. With the first
messages exchanged between new peers, they inform each
other of a random subset of locally known addresses with a
timestamp of at most 3 hours ago. With this mechanism a
list of addresses is maintained at each node. Each node will
also accept incoming connections (up to 125 by default). The
address of a new node is propagated through the network, so
all peers can learn about it eventually.
Ethereum and Cardano use mechanisms inspired by Kadem-
lia [64], a Distributed Hashtable (DHT) approach that has
already been widely used for file sharing. Kademlia assigns
key-value pairs to sets of peers based on the distance between
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Figure 4: Topology Topics
the key ID and the node IDs and a routing table structure is
maintained that allows to find responsible nodes recursively
in a logarithmic number of steps.
While Kademlia and its derivatives have been used for
many years, there is no formal proof for its performance and
robustness. More theory-oriented approaches [17, 46, 102] on
the other hand, have not established themselves as alterna-
tives. [46] shows how to maintain clusters of size O(log𝑛),
each containing more than two thirds of honest nodes with
high probability. Even when the system size can vary poly-
nomially with respect to its initial size, the communication
cost induced by each node arrival or departure is O(polylog
𝑛). The approach guarantees robustness to a Byzantine ad-
versary controlling a fraction 1/3 of the nodes (could be 1/2
with the application of cryptography). The proofs guaran-
tee polylogarithmic maintenance and sampling overhead and
rely on assumptions of a synchronous network. Alternatives,
e.g., [102], based on the BLS threshold signature scheme,
demonstrate how a DHT with quorums of logarithmic size,
the time and message complexity is polylogarithmic if up
to a third of nodes per quorum is malicious. To this end,
any request needs quorum approval before getting answered
or continued to avoid SPAM and DOS attacks and prevent
wrong responses. To remain robust despite churn, routing
tables are maintained according to the Cuckoo Rule. Com-
pared to other approaches, this method requires the creation
and verification of many signatures, which is demanding.
If one can accept probabilistic failures, even more effi-
cient options are possible. Jaiyeola et al. describe in [52] how
to use quorums sizes of O(log log𝑛), despite an adversary
that controls a constant fraction of the computational re-
sources in the network. Using their DHT approach, all but an
o(1)-fraction of the machines can communicate with all but
an o(1)-fraction of the machines in the network in O(log𝑛
poly(log log𝑛)) steps. Instead of a DHT-based approach,
Brahms [17] proposes churn and Byzantine resistant sam-
pling. The paper presents an attack-resilient gossip-based
membership protocol and shows how to extract independent
uniformly random node samples from the stream of node ids
gossiped by the first. It draws its power from an assumption
of limited bandwidth avaialability: Byzantine nodes cannot
send messages unlimitedly, if one node sends more often than
expected, it is ignored. In Brahms unsynchronized gossip
rounds, nodes send addresses they know to some other nodes
(to reinforce the knowledge for underrepresented nodes), and
request known addresses from other nodes (to spread existing
knowledge). If more than the expected number of address are
received in a round, Brahms does not update its view in that
round to prevent malicious influence. Furthermore, locally
known history also influences next views to avoid poisoning.
Together with a sampling algorithm this ensures that nodes
have an approximately uniform sample of the nodes in the
system, even as long as every joining correct node knows
some correct other node. Brahms offers a tradeoff between
communication and storage and can thus be adapted to dif-
ferent needs. Such a sampling approach can also be run on
top of other solutions.
Mapping the network. In [11], Ben Mariem et al. character-
ize and analyze Bitcoins’ P2P network topology and main
properties with a purely network measurements-based ap-
proach. They present a BTC crawler in order to discover and
track all active nodes of the BTC P2P network. They also
discuss a passive approach to reconstruct the topology of a
blockchain P2P network, which can unveil miners. The paper
further describes the structure of addresses (IPv6, IPv4, Tor
hidden addresses), and presents empirical results on the geo-
location of active nodes around the world. Another approach
is presented in [22], uncovering the topology of the Bitcion
network by processing orphaned and conflicting transactions
More precisely, by sending different double-spending transac-
tions one can determine if these nodes are connected. This
is possible because of how a node’s mempool maintains or-
phaned transactions and processes conflicting transactions.
Their techniques allow mapping the topology of the Bitcoin
network in roughly 8 hours. The technique enables accurate
topology reconstruction because of how nodes deal with both
new transactions and orphaned transactions. Nodes that re-
ceive an inv-request and do not possess such a transaction
will request it from the same peer with a get_data message.
However, if the node already possesses the transaction it will
not send a get_data message. By sending different nodes or-
phaned and conflicting, double-spend transactions and timing
these actions correctly, an agent can identify if two of its peers
are connected themselves. In [67], Miller et al. determine
the Bitcoin topology by utilizing the update method of the
timestamp field in the addrMan of nodes in the network to
learn about the topology. With this approach, they show that
the deployed Bitcoin topology does not resemble a random
graph.
It is also possible to exploit transaction accumulation to
map the Bitcoin network: In the two mechanisms presented
in [44], (i) a node accumulates input transactions before prop-
agating them, and then propagates them in the original order;
(ii) nodes do not propagate contradicting transactions, so by
propagating a contradiction to two nodes, they can tell which
node is closer to the target (the one which got it first). By
observing the INV messages from the nodes (the messages
that propagate the transactions), the authors argue that it
is possible to map the neighbors of a node (by sending dif-
ferent messages to different clients). The paper also presents
effectiveness and precision plots based on simulations.
Similarly, other networks have been analyzed, including
Ethereum and Monero. For a measurement study of the
Ethereum network peers [57], researchers developed a special
node that listens to the propagation mechanism, connecting
it to the main network. The study finds that 48% of all (3
million) discovered nodes do not contribute to the Ethereum
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Mainnet (do not run the Ethereum sub-protocol or do not
operate on the main blockchain). The authors also show that
76% use the golang implementation, 17% rust, 5% javascript
(which might be cryptojacking web clients). The study also
reports on the versions of the nodes (examining stable versions
and up-to-date versions), the network size (activate peers),
geographic distribution and node age. The authors observe
that more than 40% (12%) of the nodes use US (Chinese) IP
addresses. The most widely used ASs of the nodes can be
assigned to cloud hosting providers, dominating residential or
commercial operators. In [18], a tools is presented to collect
MoneroâĂŹs P2P network information, including its network
size, (geo-)distribution, and connectivity. The researchers set
up 4Monero nodes across the world and found that 87% of the
nodes have a degree smaller than 8 (approx. 17% of the overall
number of edges), being able to map all outgoing connections
of 99% nodes in the network. The authors also succeeded to
connect to 85% of the nodes that they discovered, which may
enable network level attacks (eclipse, BGP hijacking, DOS).
There has also been some work that aims to fix some of the
mapping issues raised. One approach is to secure blockchain
network communication using SCION [98]: the design and use
of a cryptocurrency network such as Bitcoin and Ethereum
The goal of using SCION is to facilitate client node commu-
nication with a more direct, point-to-point infrastructure to
prevent attacks and numerous cases of lost cryptocurrency
from network hijacks and BGP route poisoning/spoofing.
Eclipsing / Splitting the network. Splitting the Bitcoin net-
work can have severe consequences, as the shorter chain
produced will not survive and as a result, many transactions
are rolled back (and potentially double-spent), the revenue of
miners from these blocks is lost. Partitions affect the ability
of participants to operate on transactions. This may cause
exchanges to stop receiving and sending the cryptocurrency,
and merchants to be unable to get paid. There are several
ways to isolate nodes in the network: for example, by disrupt-
ing the routing of traffic between them, or by causing nodes
to connect only to attackers (Eclipsing). We list here a few
well-known eclipse attacks, and some techniques suggested
in the literature to detect and avoid them.
In Bitcoin, nodes choose their peers from a list of stored IP
addresses. This list is limited in size and IPs must be evicted
if fresh ones are placed inside. IPs are placed in the list
pseudo-randomly in a way that is based on the IP itself and
the IP of the advertising node. In [48], the authors explore
ways of isolating nodes in Bitcoin by affecting the way that
nodes choose their peers. The main idea of the attack is to
announce many IPs to the node that are either controlled by
the attacker or that have no node behind them. The node
eventually evicts all IPs of honest nodes from the list, and will
only connect to the attacker. The idea is to cause collisions
in the placement of similar IPs and of IPs advertised by
the same node, thus the attack above needs some minimal
number of IP addresses controlled by the attacker to succeed.
This number is not high in practice. Also Ethereum is the
target of eclipse attack constructions. In [100], Ethereum’s
peer-to-peer network is partitioned without monopolizing
the connections of the victim, which is possible due to the
block propagation design of Ethereum. In this attack, the
attacker can potentially keep the victim from receiving a
block almost indefinitely. This attack could be used as an
infrastructure for a double spend attack. The authors also
present an exploit that can force a node to accept a longer
chain with lower total difficulty than the main chain (also
using the block sync mechanism). In this attack a node that
newly connects to the network and receives a chain that is
longer than the valid chain but has a lower total difficulty
because the adversary advertised a higher total difficulty than
honest nodes. The attacker is therefore disconnected from
the network. The authors highlight a bug in EthereumâĂŹs
difficulty calculation as well. This can be used in an attack
that prevents the victim from synchronizing with the valid
chain. The paper also outlines countermeasures.
Two attacks on Bitcoin exploiting the networking stack
are presented in [5]. First, BGP hijacking that is used to
disconnect parts of the network. The network is shown to be
poorly distributed, so that relatively few prefixes need to be
hijacked in order to partition miners from each other. Once
a partition is fixed, natural churn allows nodes to connect
across the partition and blocks are once again propagated.
A second attack proposed in the paper utilizes the fact that
Bitcoin traffic at the time was un-encrypted. Intervention in
the content of announcements of new blocks and transactions
as well as requests for the data of recently announced blocks
was shown to severely delay block propagation. As a result
nodes are left uninformed of the latest blocks in the chain
for longer periods, which causes miners to waste time mining
blocks that will be discarded and will yield no reward, and
users to be unaware of funds they may already have received.
A game theoretic approach is used in [92] to manage the
list of known peers. Consequently, attackers need to corrupt a
large number of nodes to eclipse a node successfully. Similarly
to the Bitcoin protocol, the paper assumes that acquiring
IPs from the same prefix is cheaper than acquiring the same
number of IPs from multiple prefixes, and utilizes this fact
in the peer selection mechanism to increase the attack cost.
In [68] the authors investigate new “Stubborn Mining”
attacks which combine eclipse attack with selfish mining [34]
attacks. In this work, the authors consider the same model
against users who are also eclipsed in the network and show
the effect to which eclipsed users help a stubborn mining
attacker. Overall, eclipse attacks empower adversarial agents
with a larger strategy space to continue running attacks,
and when paired with stubborn mining strategies, enable an
attacker to improve their relation fraction of block rewards
beyond traditional selfish mining strategies.
In [93], Tran et al. present the EREBUS attack, that parti-
tions the Bitcoin network without any routing manipulations,
which makes the attack undetectable (even against bug fixes
specifically adressing partitioning attacks). Adversaries who
may control large transit ISPs, are able to mount the attack.
The adversary utilizes a large number of network addresses
reliably over an extended period of time. A fix attempt to this
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attack is suggested here. This work enables Bitcoin core to
prefer to connect to peers which are on different source ASNs
to try to reduce the probability of any single host/path/hijack
is relied on by a peer. The authors focus on the process of
building the AS map, including simple filtering suggestions
such as treating prefixes only reachable via a common up-
stream as if they were hosted directly on that upstream (by
pulling routing information don diverse sources).
SABRE [4] presents a secure and scalable Bitcoin relay
network resilient to routing attacks, designed to run alongside
the existing peer-to-peer network and is easily deployable.
The network is designed to efficiently handle high bandwidth
loads, including Denial of Service attacks. The relay network
provides security to Bitcoin clients by enabling them to learn
the latest mined blocks and to propagate them network-
wide. The authors use properties of BGP to predict where
would be a good place to host relay nodes – locations that are
inherently protected against routing attacks and on paths that
are economically-preferred by the majority of Bitcoin clients.
In addition, they provide resiliency through soft/hardware
co-design through the use of caching, and offloading most
operations to hardware (programmable network devices).
This enables SABRE relay nodes to sustain load even when
originating by DDoS attackers.
The effectiveness of mining pools can also be hampered
by Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS) in order
to disrupt their operations. As a consequence a competing
mining pool is slowed down giving an advantage to other
pools. This in turn may encourage individual miners to leave
unreliable mining pools and join the attacker’s pool as a result.
After currency exchanges, Bitcoin mining pools are the most
frequent victim of DDOS attacks [97]. Of 49 mining pools,
12 experienced (repeated) DDoS attacks. Based on a game
theoretic model where pools can select between investing
funds into additional mining equipment or DDOS attacks [53],
larger mining pools have a slightly greater incentive to attack
than smaller mining pools.
Man in the middle attacks. In [29], the authors study the
impact of Man-In-The-Middle Attacks on Ethereum. The
paper looks closely at the feasibility of MITM and double
spending attacks on simulated network corresponding to
the real Ethereum topology with real network components.
They show the impact of such attacks, also gathering public
information about the network, and mimicing the structure
of its biggest 10 mining pools connected through 5 BGP
routers, and performing BGP hijacking and ARP spoofing.
The authors find that the attack is almost infeasible in the
public context (because of its structure), but in the case of
route hijacking (e.g. if Ethereum is deployed over a WAN in
a consortium environment, and an adversary that has control
on the border gate) could double-spend through either BGP
hijacking or ARP spoofing with a success rate up-to 80%.
Empirical results. The open nature of the Bitcoin and Ethereum
network attracted a number of studies of their characteristics.
Donet et al. [25] report that in 2014 nodes placed in Unites
States and China summed up to 37% of the discovered nodes.
Germany, United Kingdom, and Russia also had a large share
of nodes of the network, with 9%, 4%, and 7%, respectively.
Japan, Brazil, Mexico, and China had low adoption rates,
with the number of Bitcoin nodes being less than 3 per every
100k Internet Users. In contrast, the Netherlands, Norway,
Finland, and the Czech Republic have the highest adoption
rates, more than 10 times higher than those showed by Brazil.
Most of the detected nodes, remain connected for a short
time only, merely 5,769 nodes remain (which represents only
a 0.66% of the discovered ones) after 37 days.
Neudecker [70] describes the methodology and results of
his ongoing measurement campaign (2015-2018), including
a comparison with measurements from other sources (all
reproduce the same general trends, and show the same short-
term effects). The total number of connections studied varied
between less than 6,000 connections in late 2016 and around
14,000 connections in 2018. The number of Sybil peers de-
tected is generally very low (less than 50 prior to July 2017,
less than 200 after August 2017), with the exception of short
events in June 2017 and August 2017. The average share of
peers connected for at least one day varies between 55% and
75%, the share of peers connected for at least one week varies
between 20 % and 50 %.
In 2017, [38] investigated bandwidth, latency, and decen-
tralization metrics in the Bitcoin and Ethereum network.
The observed bandwidth varies between different protocols,
and the paper reports averages between 70 and 90 Mbps for
Bitcoin and 55.0 Mbps for Ethereum nodes. The latencies
they measure are 135ms and 171ms on average for Bitcoin
and Ethereum nodes respectively. With respect to mining
power, the authors show that in Bitcoin, the weekly mining
power of a single entity has never exceeded 21% of the overall
power. In contrast, the top Ethereum miner has never had
less than 17% of the mining power. Moreover, the top four
Bitcoin miners have more than 53% of the average mining
power. On average, 61% of the weekly power was shared by
only three Ethereum miners. These observations suggest a
slightly more centralized mining process in Ethereum.
Feld et al. [36] and Apostolokai et al. [5] pointed out
a strong AS-level centralization that may impact Bitcoin
networkâĂŹs connectivity âĂŞ i.e. 10 ASes contain over 30%
of peers, with 39 IP prefixes hosting half of the overall mining
power.
5.3 Open Questions
Open Question 10. Topology information hiding: How
can the overlay topology be efficient yet make it hard for at-
tackers to learn it and mount eclipse and hijacking attacks?
Answers to this question provide discovery mechanisms that
strike a balance between containing truthful information and
DOS resistance, e.g., using overlay rotation and sharding
mechanisms that minimize the information necessary to par-
ticipate in a crypto currency network.
Open Question 11. Giant honest component:Most crypto-
currencies employ a flooding-based strategy to broadcast on a
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Open Question Methodologies
How to accelerate block propagation? PROT, ALG, GAME,
SEC, CRYPTO
How to incentivise mining blocks with
many valid transactions?
GAME
How to broadcast blocks within a pool? ALG, PROT
Efficient network design for mining
pools
PROT, ALG
Should pools be allowed? GAME
How to avoid transaction floods? SEC, GAME
How to balance DOS prevention and
0-confirmation requirements?
PROT, GAME, ALG
How to model and analyze crypto cur-
rency?
PROT, GAME
How to implement a suitable reward
system?
GAME
Topology information hiding SEC, CRYPT, ALG
Giant honest component ALG
Link failure models PROT, ALG
How to incentivize nodes to contribute
to efficient routing?
PROT, SEC, GAME
Scalable payment routing strategies PROT, GAME
How to limit congestion? PROT, ALG
How to balance privacy and efficiency
in channels’ liquidity observability?
SEC, ALG, CRYPT
How to protect light client from spoof-
ing?
PROT, GAME, SEC
How to protect from isolation and hi-
jacking attacks?
PROT, ALG, GAME
Table 1: Open network questions and methodologies needed
to address them: ALGorithms, network PROTocols, GAME
theory, SECurity, CRYPTography.
topology constructed with a (pseudo) random process. Non-
honest nodes may choose to drop messages or forward out-
dated and wrong information. For a broadcast to succeed, thus
enough honest nodes must be connected to each other via at
least one path, not containing bad nodes. To this end, graphs
must provide large connected components that consist of only
honest nodes.
Open Question 12. Link failure models: Traditional fail-
ure models consider the number of faulty nodes as the main
parameter when analyzing P2P networks. For a more nuanced
analysis, link failures must be taken into account as well. Link
failures can be modelled as random processes or in a worst-
case fashion that is bounded in some way (e.g., a strongly
connected union of available links when considering a time
interval [47]). More granular models and analyses tailored to
the cryptocurrency conditions and constraints are necessary
to better understand current cryptocurrency networks and to
build the basis for future designs.
6 OFF-CHAIN PAYMENT CHANNELS
6.1 What is it about?
Scaling limitations and transaction latencies have led to a rich
corpus of work exploring different blockchain scaling solutions:
Figure 5: Off-chain Payment Channels Topics
including alternative blockchain consensus architectures [32,
56, 59, 66, 76], sharding [39, 60] or side-chains (mechanisms
that allow digital assets from one blockchain to be used in a
diffferent ones) [8], to just name a few [9].
Off-chain peer-to-peer networks are emerging as a par-
allel effort to rendering on-chain networks more scalable.
Off-chain or so-called “layer-2” protocols (built on top of the
layer-1 blockchains) are typically defined as protocols that
do not publish every transaction on the blockchain immedi-
ately (contrary to on-chain transactions) and entirely rely on
the consensus algorithm of a parent-chain. Off-chain proto-
cols rely on channels which establish a private peer-to-peer
medium, governed by pre-set rules, e.g., a smart contract,
allowing the involved parties to consent to state updates
unanimously by exchanging authenticated state transitions
off-chain.
Channels can come in different flavors, e.g., channels which
are formed between 𝑛 parties, or commit-chains, which serve
a similar purpose as payment channels and rely on a central
but untrusted intermediary. One can also distinguish between
payment channels which are off-chain payment interactions,
and more general state channels, which are arbitrary off-
chain interactions. Side-chains [8, 9] do not classify as layer-2
solutions due to having their own consensus algorithm.
Payment channels emerged to support rapid one-way pay-
ments, then transitioned towards bi-directional channel de-
signs where both parties can issue and receive payments. State
channels generalize the concept to support the execution of
arbitrary state transitions.
To give an example, consider two companies which trans-
act frequently with each other. Rather than settling all their
transactions on the blockchain the companies can each trans-
fer a balance to a unique joint account, which is recorded
in the blockchain, such that each party is entitled to receive
its original balance once their joint account is closed. After-
wards, the parties can privately send money to each other
using their cryptographic keys and update the state of their
joint account, without revealing the updated state to the rest
of the P2P network.
Since updates are not always recorded in the blockchain,
the balance of the state channel changes over time, based
on the transactions between the companies. When any of
the parties wishes to close the state channel, it can submit
the most updated state to the rest of the network to be
recorded in the blockchain, thus closing the state channel
and passing the funds back to the companies based on their
most updated balance. State channels enable the same type
of interactions as the Consensus Layer, without recording
them in the blockchain. However they also introduce new
complexities. For example, safety measures are required to
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prevent a dishonest party from closing of a state channel
using an earlier version of the state channel, thus omitting
recent payments.
Popular payment channel networks (PCNs) include Bitcoin
Lightning [79], Ethereum Raiden [81], and XRP Ripple [37],
to name a few. In all these networks, each node typically
represents a user and each directed, weighted edge represents
funds escrowed on a blockchain; these funds can be transacted
only between the endpoints of the edge. Many PCNs such as
Lightning and Raiden use source routing, in which the source
of a payment specifies the complete route for the payment.
If the global view of all nodes is accurate, source routing is
highly effective because it finds all paths between pairs of
nodes.
In several respects, routing in PCNs is fairly different from
routing in traditional communication networks: in traditional
communication networks, routing algorithms typically aim
to find short and low-load paths in a network whose links
are subject to fixed capacity constraints. In a PCN, link
capacities represent payment balances, which can be highly
dynamic: every transaction changes the payment balance
initially set up for the channel.
Existing network routing algorithms for data transmission
experience unique challenges when applied to PCNs. Node
links and bandwidth capacities in data networks are not
considered private information. In contrast, a PCN routing
algorithm changes the state of the traversed channels to
secure the asset delivery from the sender to the receiver.
Depending on the transaction amount, certain channels may
not be suitable to route a payment, and channel balances
are thus an obstacle that routing algorithms have to account
for [90]. An executed channel transaction permanently alters
the state of all channels along the path.
6.2 State of the Art
We review state-of-the-art approaches structured around
the different aspects which arise in off-chain networks: from
channel establishment over route discovery to supporting
scalability.
Routing and Channel Establishment. A distinguishing feature
of PCNs is that they also support transactions between
participants without direct channels, using multihop routing.
In a nutshell, users can efficiently transmit funds from node
A to B by relaying them over a path connecting A to B,
as long as each edge in the path contains enough balance
(escrowed funds) to support the transaction.
However, design tradeoffs and security implications of
such multi-hop routing are not well-understood today [63].
Scalability is a concern here: currently, the Lightning network
comprises more than 10k nodes and 35k channels, which are
updated and changed frequently. We will dedicate a separate
subsection to scalability, and focus on additional aspects in
the following.
It has been shown that cost-efficient routing, aiming to
minimize fees, can sometimes be exploited. Tochner et al. [91]
identify and analyze a novel DoS attack arising in PCNs,
based on an inherent tradeoff between how efficient (and
hence predictable) versus how secure routes are: for cost-
effectiveness, the routing algorithm should find paths with
low transaction fees. The fees of a layer-two transaction
should be lower than the fees for a layer-one transaction.
To provide privacy, routing paths should be found without
disclosing transaction values (i.e. value privacy) and the
involved parties (i.e. sender and receiver privacy). Tochner
et al.’s attack is based on route hijacking and exploits the
way transactions are routed and executed along the created
channels of the network. The idea is that an attacker can first
create channels that increase the probability that transactions
will route through it. Using an amplification attack, the
attacker can increase the delay of the new channels, delaying
payments for the period of the hijack attack. The authors
empirically show that with just 5 channels, an attacker can
hijack the majority of transactions (≈ 60%, while 30 channels
hijack ≈ 90%). The authors also discuss countermeasures,
also showing a simple example where a small change in the
existing weight function of the routing algorithm decreases
the hijack affect of such attacks.
Similar in spirit is the work by Tang et al. [89]. In PCNs,
whenever a transaction succeeds, edge weights are updated.
However, the new channel balances (i.e., edge weights) are
usually not revealed to users directly for privacy reasons.
This can lead to inefficiencies: when determining a route for
transactions, users first have to guess a path that might be
suitable, and then check if it really supports the transaction.
This guess-and-check process dramatically reduces the success
rate of transactions. At the other extreme, knowing full
channel balances can give substantial improvements in success
rate at the expense of privacy. To address this problem, Tang
et al. [89] studied whether a network can reveal noisy channel
balances to trade off privacy for utility. The authors show
that in general, what can be achieved in this context is fairly
limited. They then propose noise mechanisms and find that
it is not possible to get large gains in utility by giving up a
little privacy, or large gains in privacy by sacrificing a little
utility. Hence, the authors argue that it is optimal to operate
either in the low-privacy or low-utility regime.
The routing and hence the performance of the network
typically heavily depends on the fees. Di Stasi et al. [24] sug-
gested to change the way how nodes apply fees for forwarding
payments, while trying to keep the network balanced and
improve performance, also using a multipath routing payment
scheme, to further reduce the fees paid by users and keep
the network balanced. In particular, the authors argue that
there are requirements that the fee function should satisfy,
and are not currently fulfilled. Di Stasi et al. also discuss the
problem of finding multiple paths between a source and a
target, to improve transaction routing.
In order to ensure anonymity, onion routing is usually used,
which however requires the random selection of nodes in a
path. SilentWhispers [62] and SpeedyMurmurs [86] formalize
and address concrete notions of privacy in this context. Spi-
derNetwork [88] improves the effectiveness of source routing
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in a dynamic PCN by favoring routes that minimize the bal-
ance difference as well as on-chain rebalancing, meaning that
nodes deposit additional coins to improve the balance; their
routing relies on a packet-switched network, that is, instead
of routing a complete payment, the payment is split into
constant-size units which are routed individually, mitigating
channel capacity limitations. SpiderNetwork is therefore ef-
fective even when balances are constantly changing, at the
cost of higher latencies if on-chain rebalancing is used.
Routing in Large-Scale Topologies. Today’s routing algorithms
require every node to know (and maintain) the entire topol-
ogy, in order to be able to compute a route toward the trans-
action’s target. This stands in contrast with the objective
to support lightweight nodes (e.g., wallets) in the network,
which should be able to perform transactions as fast as pos-
sible, requiring minimal disk space and control traffic (e.g.,
to acknowledge new nodes and channels’ updates). In this
sense, the underlying challenges are reminiscent of wireless
and adhoc networks [77]: nodes are resource-constrained and
can decide with whom to establish new connections (which
comes at a cost).
One of the first and well-known scalable approaches is
Flare routing [80] with beacon nodes. First, the node proac-
tively maintain a list of channels and beacons in its close
neighborhood. The route discovery process first compares the
local knowledge with the target, and if a route was not found
then it queries the beacons for a route between them. The
source node will finally choose a route from the results using
heuristic ranks. The incentive of the beacon is to increase the
chances that a node will route through it, and it will earn
the routing fee.
A major step ahead was then made by the Lightning
developers, that relaxed this approach by assuming that
nodes can store and maintain the whole network topology
and state: Lightning introduces the notion of trampoline
nodes [2] to which light-weight clients can outsource the
route computation. In order to find trampoline nodes, light-
weight clients can simply use a breadth-first search. The
trampoline nodes know the entire topology (using the current
gossiping methodology) and can hence provide routes. To
provide incentives Lightning employs fee mechanisms.
A user that wish to find a route can query multiple tram-
poline nodes, thus the trampoline’s incentive is to suggest
the best route comparing to his competitors, and maximize
the chance that the node will route through the him (and
therefore pay the trampoline’s fees).
A work by Tochner and Schmid [90] analyzes the trade-
off triangle between Confidentiality (using a third party to
discover a route), Efficiency (the user’s cost to use a route)
and Effectiveness (the availability of the route) of the route
discovery process. The authors shows analytically that the
user can not find a route discovery policy that maximize this
tradeoffs, and show empirically that there are topologies in
which the tradeoff is bounded.
Topology. There are several interesting studies on the topology
of transaction networks. In particular, Rohrer et al. [85]
study the resilience of the Lightning network to topology-
based attacks, and in particular, to isolation attacks. The
authors argue that the Lightning network can be classified as
a small-world and scale free network and show that in order
to perform a resource-limited attack, the attacker should
employ a highest ranked minimum cut strategy. However,
high budgets (around 200BTC) are required to give the
adversary the power to reliably disturb all payment attempts.
Nisslmueller et al. [96] also showed that active and passive
topology exploration can be exploited to attack confidentiality
in off-chain networks.
Offline Nodes. Typically, intermediaries along a channel route
are required to remain online and explicitly confirm all medi-
ated transactions. Dziembowski et al. [28, 80] address these
shortcomings with the introduction of virtual channels that
support payment and state transitions. All intermediaries
along the route can lock coins for a fixed period of time and
both parties can treat the path as a new virtual channel con-
necting them directly. In this manner, A and B can transact
without interacting with intermediaries along the path, thus
reducing the transaction latency. Virtual channels are limited
by the need to recursively set up a new virtual channel for
every intermediary along the path. It is the intermediary’s
responsibility to ensure the channels close appropriately. In
[65], McCorry et al. introduce the Pisa protocol which en-
ables parties to delegate to a third party to provide security
even to parties that may go off-line for an extended period
of time. Zeta Avarikioti et al. followed a similar idea in [6],
and suggested to use external parties that both parties of the
channel agreed on, and “approve" any unilaterally action.
6.3 Open Problems
Off-chain networks do not only introduce promising new
solutions but also several new challenges, e.g., related to how
transactions are routed or information “gossiped”, or related
to how the topology should be designed. Indeed, routing and
topology become more tightly coupled in offchain networks,
as nodes cannot only strategically choose routes but also
channels: both the establishment as well as the use of payment
channels is an inherently strategic decision, and subject to
complex incentives and the extent to which a participant
thinks she or he can benefit from different behaviors. A
participant may not only try to strategically maximize her
or his profit, but may also be malicious.
Open Question 13. How should nodes be incentivized to
contribute to efficient routing? Several state-of-the-art works
have identified issues with the current fee-based routing scheme
used, e.g., in Lightning. For example, by announcing low fees,
nodes can launch a Denial-of-Service attack on transaction
routing. Can we design a pricing scheme which on the one
hand avoids these issues and on the other hand still incen-
tivizes nodes to contribute resources?
Open Question 14. How to design payment routing strate-
gies to be more scalable? The main question is: Are there
better alternatives to source routing? Several state-of the art
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approaches such as Flare and Trampoline nodes have been pro-
posed lately, but there is still a long way to go in finding safe
and scalable strategies. In particular, routing options today
heavily depend on fees, which can cause congestion problems
and even be used to devise attacks against the network.
Open Question 15. How to limit congestion on individual
channels? This question relates to the previous one. Since
today routing depends heavily on fees (which are controlled
by the nodes that own the channel), a single node can have
a very large effect on the entire network. Is this a case for
traffic engineering?
Open Question 16. Should payments be routable along
multiple paths? In particular, how can this be achieved in an
efficient and secure manner?
Open Question 17. Can routing be made aware of the
current liquidity balance in channels? In particular, this raises
the question about a possible efficiency-privacy tradeoff.
Open Question 18. How can light clients be protected
from spoofing? E.g., clients may aim to spoof channels, fees
on the blockchain, etc.
Open Question 19. How can we protect against isola-
tion and hijacking attacks? We suggest studying whether long
liquidity lock attacks can be prevented. In particular, what
strategies can the network deploy to prevent the success of
such attacks? This question is relevant both in the context of
channels, and the gossip network.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper presented an overview of the cryptocurrency net-
working aspects, with a focus on open research questions,
and towards this goal, covering also background and state-of-
the-art. We believe that the networking aspects have not yet
received the attention they deserve, and hope that our paper
can contribute toward more research in this space.
Table 1 provides a summary of these questions, structured
around the methodologies needed to address them, from
algorithms, over network protocols, game theory, security, to
cryptography.
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